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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation was written as part of the MSc in Banking and Finance at the International 
Hellenic University. The present study seeks to determine the impact of the Covid-19 external 
shock on the stock return volatility of global firms. To accomplish the above objective, the study 
uses a sample of 30,516 firms, scattered across 63 countries, for the period 31 December 2019 to 
30 September 2020. Panel data analyses verify the hypothesis that Covid-19 cases (fatalities) 
have a positive and statistically significant impact on stock return volatility of global firms, meas-
ured at different estimation intervals (windows of 30, 60, 90, 180, and 250 days). In particular, a 
one standard deviation increase in Covid-19 cases (fatalities) is associated with 0.79% (0.86%) 
increase in firm volatility. In this light, the study might be advantageous to a wide spectrum of in-
vestors, portfolio managers, and decision-makers who have to invest in an uncertain world. 
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The high uncertainty of the Covid-19 has battered the global market and had drastic con-
sequences for trade, supply chains, and economies. The most noticeable effect of the outbreak 
has been an unexpected decline in global transport activity. By the end of March 2020, global road 
transport was almost 50% below the 2019 average, while the commercial flight activity was almost 
75% below 2019 by mid-April 20201. It’s also worth stating, at the outset, that the demand for 
global oil in April was estimated to be 29mb/d lower than the previous year, down to a level last 
seen in 19952. To the extent of the damage, equities drastically plummeted, while market volatility 
soared upwards globally. By late March, the US stock market hit the circuit breaker mechanism 
four times. Moreover, stock markets in Europe and Asia were particularly sensitive during this pe-
riod. The strongest overreaction was noted among the hardest-hit countries. For example, FTSE 
and the UK’s main index plunged by more than 10%, also Japan’s stock market declined by more 
than 20%3. 
The novel Covid-19 was triggered in Wuhan China in late December 2019 and soon ex-
panded to other cities across China. According to media reports and government data, the first 
reported cases outside China can be dated back to 20 January 2020. While the occurrence of the 
Covid-19 could not be prevented, European coordination to control the situation was far from per-
fect. Consequently, Italy was the first European country that proclaimed the outbreak on 11 March. 
By evaluating the remarkable transmissibility of the virus and the velocity of its global spread, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) declared the Covid-19 outbreak a global pandemic on 11 March 
20204. 
Ever since governments worldwide have applied rigorous measures to minimize both fatali-
ties and infections which tend to become more intense in the long term. China was the first country 
that has adopted extreme measures to minimize Covid-19 expansion including restraining people 
to their homes, encouraging social distancing, prohibiting large-scale private and public gather-
ings, and even locking down one-third of its cities5. In light of this, also De Bruin et al., (2020) pro-
vided a detailed analysis of risk mitigation measures that are taken by countries around the world 
                                               
1
 See more: Azzam Abu-Rayashet al.,(2020) Analysis of electricity demand amidst the COVID-19 Coronavirus  Pandemic, Energy  
Research and  Social Science.,68 
2
Source: IEA (2020), IEA Oil Market Report-April 2020, https://www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-april-2020 
3
See more: Zhang et al (2020) Financial markets under the global pandemic of COVID-19, Finance Research Letters,36 
4
Source: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/covid-19/timeline-ecdc-response 
5
 Source: The short-term impacts of COVID-19 lockdown on urban air pollution in China, (He et al., 2020) 
 
2 
such as restrictions to move freely, economic-social distancing, communication, hygiene 
measures, etc. 
The Covid-19 threat inevitably led to tremendous health and economic damages. A report 
by John Hopkins University real-time data analytics, confirms that 43,385,581 people have been 
infected worldwide with a total cumulative death of 1,157,7146. The expansion of the pandemic 
was so rapid, that even the most advanced economies were unable to respond to it immediately 
and adequately. In the first quarter of 2020, China proclaimed a drop in GDP of 6.3% compared to 
the first quarter of 20197 while the US economy shrank by 4.8% (Erdem, 2020). The EU’s GDP is 
also estimated to drop by 6.3% according to Gormsen and Koijen (2020) estimation. Consequent-
ly, the world is expecting to face budget cuts, since the cost of Covid-19 may result in a loss of 
$8.8 trillion, or around to 10% of global gross domestic product. On the other hand travel re-
strictions and lockdowns could cut global capital by $1.7 trillion to $2.6 trillion8. Under this scenar-
io, the International Monetary Fund planned a global growth rate of -3% in 2020 (Erdem, 2020). 
Given the importance of Covid-19, the analysis sheds light on the global stock market re-
turns as a response to the outbreak. Researchers have fairly recently started to investigate the 
Covid-19 impact on stock price volatility (Yousef, 2020; Al-Awadhi, Alsaifi, Al-Awadhi and Alham-
madi, 2020). Yousef (2020) affirms that the equity returns of G7 indices and their volatility are like-
ly to be positively related to the number of daily new cases, and the growth rate of daily new cases 
invoked by Covid-19. Meanwhile, Al-Awadhi, Alsaifi, Al-Awadhi and Alhammadi (2020) revealed 
that the stock market has reacted with strong negative returns to the daily growth in total confirmed 
cases/deaths caused by Covid-19. 
Despite similarities with the aforementioned studies, my study diverges in the following 
ways. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that estimates the impact of Covid-19 on 
global stock return volatility. Hence, it contributes to the literature on the impact of external shocks 
on stock return volatility. I capture Covid-19 impact using daily observations for Covid-19 
measures, while I simultaneously control for firm-level determinants associated with return volatility 
(on a quarterly basis), to capture the impact of Covid-19 on stock return volatility. The study also 
contributes to the global financial markets current literature. Thus, it extends the literature of global 
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https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html, Last updated: 2020/10/27 
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Source: Hofman (2020) The global Pandemic. How COVID-19 has changed the world, Journal of International Relations and Sustain-
able Development, pp. 60-69 
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 Source: Bloomberg Quint, https://www.bloombergquint.com/global-economics/coronavirus-may-cost-the-global-economy-8-8-trillion-
adb-says, Last Updated:2020/05/16 
 
3 
financial markets, by taking into consideration a global scale. The sample selection model tracks 
60% from approximately 51.000 active listed global firms9. 
According to Jones et al., (2004), high levels of volatility relates to a greater chance of a 
bearish market. Based on this framework the more persistent and higher the volatility is the higher 
the uncertainty and the probability of risk. Furthermore, they support the study finding by claiming 
that both uncertainty and risk may generate a decline in equity markets value. The finding is also 
in harmony with (De Garcia and Biscarri, 2004; Gonzalez et al., 2005; Tu, 2006) conjecture. They 
suggest that stock market volatility appears to be higher during bear markets rather than bull mar-
kets. 
This study contributes to prior literature in the following ways. First, the analysis adds to the 
existing studies which have explored the impact of external shocks (natural disasters, financial cri-
ses) on the stock market. For example, Rastogi (2014) argues that stock markets of different na-
tions have been overwhelmed by the financial crisis of 2008 impact on the volatility and leverage 
parameters. In the same context, Anagnostidis et al., (2016) confirm that the 2008 crisis has unfa-
vorably affected the stock price efficiency of major Eurozone capital markets. Second, it expands 
the existing limited literature which examines the impact of Covid-19 on financial market volatility. 
Zaremba et al., (2020) highlighted the influence of government responses to Covid-19 on interna-
tional equity market volatility. The results documented pronounced increases in volatility. Further, 
Baker et al., (2020) used textual analysis of news mentions and noticed that the Covid-19 pan-
demic has resulted in the highest stock market volatility among all recent infectious diseases in-
cluding the Spanish Flu of 1918. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section provides the theory and hy-
pothesis development. Section 3 presents the research methodology. Section 4 presents the data 
and empirical tests, while section 5 concludes the study. 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Risk is prescribed as an event where the outcome is linked with uncertainties. Thus, the 
impact of risk is very much reflected in the financial performance of the firm, since it reveals infor-
mation about fluctuations that may occur in share price (market risk) (Bloom and Milkovich, 1988). 
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Against this background, controlling for stock return volatility is crucial for investors as it affects a 
firm’s future strategies (e.g., to take advantage of emerging opportunities or to reduce the risk of 
failures) (Bloom and Milkovich, 1988; Purdy et al., 1997). More specifically, market risk is essential 
for investor’s portfolio diversification decisions. Prior research presumed that most investors 
choose not to “fully” diversify their portfolio for several reasons such as a) transactions costs (Ang 
et al., 2006), b) investor preferences heterogeneity (e.g., preferences for stocks with higher volatili-
ty) (Goetzmann & Kumar, 2008) c) financial constraint (Xu & Malkiel, 2003), d) background risk as 
in (Heaton and Lucas, 2000), etc. Therefore, understanding the firm market risk key drivers is es-
sential for enhancing investor’s wealth, since under-diversification may result in higher risk (Ab-
delsalam et al., 2020). 
Risk mitigation is also crucial for a wide spectrum of portfolio managers, and decision-
makers. Portfolio managers must be aware of the current risk structure, and how it changes. Be-
sides, they should assure investors that uncertainties and risks are carefully administrated 
(DeLoach, 2000). As risk expands very quickly, decision-making processes also ought to be well-
planned (e.g., decisions to diminish potential losses will inevitably lead to larger safety measures 
costs such as safer technologies)10. In this framework, the process of handling risk suitably has 
been problematic, as markets have had to make their adjustments against a back-drop of chal-
lenging and volatile markets environment.  
This topic has gained even more increasing attention during the global financial crisis peri-
od, when individual assets and markets were crushed by catastrophic events, whose ex-ante like-
lihood was considered negligible. Earlier studies have identified several external shocks that have 
affected stock returns such as weather events, earthquakes, recession, and diseases (Ho et al., 
2004). Hence, a large number of volatility models have been applied to analyze market reaction to 
these shocks.  
Scholars have long debated the impact of financial events on the global economy. Existing 
literature confirms that the economy cannot adjust immediately to unexpected price changes, lead-
ing to catastrophic consequences. According to Bekaert and Wu (2000) if volatility is priced, an 
anticipated increase in its levels will lead to a higher required return on equity and lower stock 
price. The divergence of market prices from real values is not only a phenomenon of the present 
but also prominent since the past hundred years e.g., the Great Recession of 1929, the Dotcom 





bubble of 1999-200111 and the 2008 global financial crisis. Not surprisingly, the presence of a se-
ries of downward shift prices during these periods made people uncertain about the level of future 
revenues. 
Empirical evidence confirmed that stock market panics during the 1929 crash enforced 
consumers to forgo purchases of durable goods. On the other hand, the reduced income as a se-
quel of the stock market panic diminished the collateral on which individuals and corporations used 
to borrow and thus gave a pass to the first step of the Great Recession (Romer, 1990; Sumner, 
1992). During this period several political and economic events took place such as the Smoot-
Hawley tariff, the rise of the Nazi party, and the banking failures in the United States and France. 
All these events were linked with sharp breaks in stock and commodity prices. From 1929 to 1932, 
U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) dwindled from $103.1 billion to $58.0 billion. The Dow reached 
its low (40.56 points) in July 1932 (James, 2010). In a similar vein (Parker) approve that the supply 
of money declined by 35 percent, while prices went down by 33 percent. 
Graham et al., (2011) expand the literature by analyzing the cost of distress on firm-level 
data. The results report that firms with high leverage levels and firms with low bond ratings place a 
priority on becoming financially distressed, confirming the trade-off theory. As claimed by Schwert, 
(1990a), highly leveraged firms are related to high levels of volatility since stockholders must bear 
the major part of the risk of the assets. Although many attempts are undertaken to examine risk-
return relations in developed countries (the US, Japan, UK) little is done on exploring this relation-
ship in the global stock market. For instance, (Li et., al 2005) provide evidence that a significant 
and negative relationship exists between stock returns and volatility in 6 out of 12 global stock 
markets examined. 
The notable effort of Siegel (1992) simulates the relation of the linkage between various 
factors of investment sentiment and the returns on the US stock market during the 1987 meltdown. 
He concluded that shifts in investor sentiment such as the ratio of odd-lot sales, discounts on 
closed-end funds, etc, were a fundamental component in the 1987 stock slump. Empirically, the 
crash implies the greatest single-day decline in history, where the Dow Jones industrials dropped 
by 508 points and the Standard and Poor (S&P) 500 index dropped by 20.5%. Karunanayake-
Athukoralalage et al., (2010) study the dynamics of volatility spillover on the stock market return of 
Australia, Singapore, the UK, and the US during two major financial crises (Asian 1997 and global 
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The dotcom bubble of 1999-2001 is labeled by many as the “Nasdaq bubble”. Specifically, the Nasdaq 100 Index increases by 128% 
ante to its peak in March 2000. By the end of 2000 however, the level of the Nasdaq was almost 30% of its peak value. During this 
period, the return volatility rose while stock prices experienced a sharp decline. The impact of the bubble was not confined to the US 
but spread throughout the world (Bakshi & Wu, 2010). 
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financial crisis of 2008). More specifically, findings reveals that both crises drive a significant jump 
in the stock return volatilities in Australia, Singapore, the US, and UK equity markets. Besides, 
they provide evidence of volatility transmission among all equity markets and unilateral volatility 
spillovers from the US and UK to the smaller markets of Australia and Singapore. The results also 
support the assumption of Schwert (1990b) that financial crisis raises the stock return volatility. 
Ample studies have affirmed that also European stock markets are vulnerable to exoge-
nous shocks exceptionally during periods of financial turmoil. Sensoy and Tabak (2015), for in-
stance, is the earliest survey that scrutinizes the global financial crisis of 2008 implications on the 
efficiency of the European stock markets. Their findings point out that the crisis has a damaging 
effect on emerging countries, relative to developed countries. In a similar manner Anagnotidis et 
al., (2016) support that market efficiency on the Eurozone stock market was affected by the global 
financial crisis of 2008, resulting in crucial levels of market inefficiency and abnormal price co-
movements. An extensive survey of the empirical literature on global transmission of the 2007-09 
financial crisis on European stock markets is provided in (Chudik and Fratzcher, 2011; Syllignakis 
and Kouretas, 2011; Kotkatvuori-Örnberg et al., 2013). 
However, the crash of the 2008 global finance is not confined exclusively to stock markets 
of major economies such as the Eurozone, or the U.S. For example, Adamu's (2010) research re-
lies on the behavior of the daily All Share Index (ASI) of the Nigerian Stock Exchange to the re-
cession of 2008. The sample is divided into the pre and post-crisis period. The results confirm that 
the market is sensitive to international events and volatility is much higher in the pre-crisis period. 
The global crisis also spread to China Yang et al., (2014), and relatively moderate economies like 
Asia Kanjamapornkul et al., (2016), Latin America Güloğlu et al., (2016). 
During recent years, public awareness towards natural events has declined compared to 
those of human origin. Nonetheless, different types of natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes, earth-
quakes, floods, bushfires, cyclones, tsunamis) still cause unpredictable harm to a global market-
place. In this spirit, various studies have been undertaken to scrutinize the impact of natural events 
on different parameters (e.g., entire stock market index, stock returns, and volatilities of local firms, 
real estate or single sector indices (e.g., insurance)) (Valizadeh et al., 2017). 
Bourdeau-Brien and Kryzanowski (2017) examine the behavior of stock returns and volatili-
ties of U.S. firms to natural disasters. The results showed that wider abnormal returns are found in 
firms placed in the disaster zone, compared to firms in nearby states. Moreover, the extreme ef-
fects have been more profound in the two or three months after the peak of disaster news cover-
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age. On the other hand (Worthington and Valadkhani, 2004) through light on the impact of severe 
disaster shocks (e.g., floods, wildfires, earthquakes, storms, cyclones) on the Australian stock 
market from 1982 to 2002. They pointed out that market returns are more sensitive to shocks pro-
vided by natural events like cyclones, bushfires, and earthquakes. Shelor et al., (1990) research 
the real estate companies and discussed the stock return reaction after the California Earthquake 
of 1989. The analysis suggests that this catastrophic event has a significant negative impact on 
stock returns among the firms performing in the San Francisco territory. Gangopadhyay et al., 
(2010) extend the literature by examining the impact of two Hurricanes (Katrina, Rita) on the insur-
er share price. Insurer share prices reacted negatively to hurricane Katrina. On the other hand, the 
reaction of insurer share prices to hurricane Rita was significant, though mixed, with posi-
tive/negative results being influenced by Rita’s changing circumstances.  
In his research, Thomann (2013) investigates the impact of the 10 most costly natural ca-
tastrophes (e.g., the hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005, Hurricane Andrew, 9-11 attacks) on the 
volatility of US insurance stocks and the correlation of insurer’s stocks with the market. The results 
generally support the hypothesis that natural disasters increase stock volatility and diminish the 
correlation except in the case of 9-11 attacks. (Hood et al., 2013; Takao et al., 2013) report that 
the Great East Japan Earthquake (also known as the 2011 Tohoku earthquake) is a strong exam-
ple of a natural disaster. One obvious effect of this event is a significant decline in the stock prices 
of insurance companies compared to non-life insurance companies. Furthermore, Real GDP fell 
sharply by 0.8% in 2011 while Nikkei 225 Index plummeted 179.95 yen or 17.3% from the previous 
year (The World Factbook, 2012)12. It seems that major natural hazards tend to harm stock market 
returns. In particular, a slump in the value of the firm’s stock could enhance financial leverage and 
its debt to equity ratio. Consequently, this may lead to increases in risk mitigation and higher vola-
tility.  
The market’s performance has recently been hit by an ascending number of infectious dis-
eases such as Ebola virus, MERS CoV, SARS, Zika virus, seasonal flu etc. The spread of these 
contagious diseases not only affects people’s health and life but also induces a decline in econom-
ic growth (Liu et al., 2020). For example, Ichev and Marinc (2018) investigate the effect of various 
announcements and mass media news on the Ebola outbreak from 2014-2016. It is shown that 
this outbreak hard-hit small and volatile stock of companies established in West African Countries 
and the US that were exposed to media coverage. Chen et al., (2007) examine the impact of the 





SARS outbreak in 2003 on the Taiwan tourism industry. They state that the epidemic affects al-
most all sectors negatively, while the tourism sector suffered the most. Their event study results 
show that the stocks of the tourism sector experience a 29% decrease within one month after the 
outbreak. 
The outbreak of Covid-19 is one of the most recent events on the international scene. Con-
sequently, there is scarce literature examining the stock market behavior during this period. How-
ever, various studies emphasized that the spread of the virus is causing great fear or shock to the 
financial markets that need further investigation. Baek et al., (2020) examined the stock market 
volatility of 30 industries operating in the US. They observe that volatility is affected by different 
economic indicators and is sensitive to Covid-19 news. In addition, they document that systematic 
risk is higher for defensive industries (e.g., utilities, telecom) and lower for aggressive industries 
(e.g., business equipment, automobiles). 
Heyden and Heyden (2020) investigate the short-term market reactions of US and Europe-
an stocks to the public information about Covid-19. While the first case of the Covid-19 does not 
have a significant impact, the announcement of the first death stimulates a negative stock price 
reaction to the Covid-19. Another strand of quickly developing literature reviews the impact of 
Covid-19 on an international scale. Liu et., al (2020) aimed to analyze the short term impact of the 
Covid-19 outbreak on 21 major stock market indices including (e.g., the US, Italy, Germany, Ja-
pan, Singapore, the UK, etc) and suggested that stock markets in most vulnerable countries and 
areas faced higher negative abnormal returns relative to other countries. 
 In another study Bash (2020) look for the effect of the first registered case of Covid-19 on 
stock market returns of 30 countries. According to the results of the event study, Covid-19 has a 
significant negative impact on index return. This finding is in line with Zhang et., al (2020) estima-
tion. They examined the volatility of ten stock markets in the countries with the highest number of 
confirmed cases between January and February 2020 and found that volatility increased substan-
tially in February due to Covid-19. Building on the work of Al-Awadhi et., al (2020), which reveals 
that stock markets around the world have reacted to the Covid-19 pandemic with strong volatility I 
map out the below hypothesis: 
H: The number of Covid-19 cases (fatalities) is positively associated with stock return vola-
tility of global firms. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Empirical model 
I rely upon a panel data analysis over the classic event study methodologies for the follow-
ing reasons: First, the spread of Covid-19 evolves a matter of days and is not one point in time. 
Second, panel data regression explains further the time-varying relationship between the depend-
ent and independent variables (Ashraf, 2017). Third, panel data analysis reduces problems such 
as heteroscedasticity, estimation bias, and multicollinearity as it extracts both cross-sectional and 
time-series variation from the underlying panel data (Wooldridge, 2010). To evaluate the impact of 
Covid-19 cases (fatalities) on stock return volatility of global firms, I estimate a regression following 
the specification outlined in equation (1): 
VOLATILITY𝑖,𝑡 = β0 + β1COVID𝑖,𝑡,𝑐  + β2ROA𝑖,𝑡 + β3LnASSETS𝑖,𝑡 + β4LEVERAGE𝑖,𝑡











where, the dependent variable (VOLATILITY) is a vector representing the volatility of daily 
stock returns at different estimating windows. Following prior studies (e.g., Dutt and Humphery-
Jenner, 2013), I estimate return volatility using a moving variance approach within estimation win-
dows of 30, 60, 90, 180, and 250 days. COVID represents the COVID-19 related measures em-
ployed in the study, namely a) the total number of COVID-19 cases in each day (LnCASESTOT) 
and b) the total number of COVID-19 related fatalities (LnDEATSHSTOT). Both COVID-19 
measures are in daily frequency, while in this analysis I transform them into natural logarithms to 
obtain better distributional properties and to reduce the impact of outliers. 
The model also considers several firm-level variables, all measured quarterly, to control 
cross-sectional differences in firm characteristics that may influence return volatility. I control for 
profitability and size using the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets 
(ROA) and the natural logarithm of total assets (LnASSETS), respectively, since larger and more 
profitable firms are more likely to experience lower return volatility (Pastor and Veronesi, 2003). As 
a measure of financial leverage, I use the ratio of total debt over total assets (LEVERAGE) be-
cause financially distressed firms are more likely to be leveraged and have higher return volatility 
(Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2011). Previous studies provide an association between volatility 
and firm growth opportunities since growing firms exhibit more f luctuations in their returns (Pástor 
and Veronesi, 2003; Cao et al., 2008). Therefore, I consider for firm growth opportunities, opera-
tionalized as the market-to-book value of equity (MB). The standard errors of all the regression 
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estimates are adjusted using heteroskedasticity-corrected and clustered robust standard errors, 
clustered on firms. 
Finally, I winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99 th percentiles to mitigate the ef-
fect of outliers, while I also include year, industry, and country indicators in all my estimates to al-
leviate any concerns for the unobserved year, industry, and country effects. YEAR_tare indicator 
variables with a value of one for year t; zero otherwise. INDUSTRY_dare indicator variables with a 
value of one for industry d; zero otherwise. COUNTRY_care indicator variables with a value of one 
for country c; zero otherwise, and ε_(i,t) is the error term. The variable definitions are presented in 
Appendix A. 
3.2 Data 
I use a panel data spanning from 31 December 2019 to 30 September 2020. I begin my 
sample selection utilising the entire universe of active and listed firms in the DataStream database, 
which is the primary source for stock price information and accounting data. I consider the country 
of the stock exchange as the relevant company location (similar to Dutt and Humphery-Jenner, 
2013), and match the number of COVID-19 cases and/or fatalities reported each day, available 
through the World Bank. At this stage, the sample comprises of 31,649 firms (translated into 
818,532 observations). My data requirements for control variables for my main model (1) further 
drop 1,105 firms, due to missing data. Following previous studies (e.g., Beck et al., 2013), my 
sample selection criteria require at least at least four firms in one country, and thus I eliminate 24 
firms. Table 1 describes the sample selection process. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The final sample comprises 30,516 firms (translated into 783,241 observations; see Table 
1 for a description) scattered across 63 countries (see Table 2). Drawing upon Table 2 reveals that 
companies from three countries predominate, namely Japan (26.01), Australia (19.95), and India 
(19.51). Additionally, the right part of Table 2 informs on the average number of daily cases and 
fatalities across our in sample firms. In particular, we observe that the US, Turkey, Brazil, Italy and 
UK belong to the top five countries in terms of the total number of COVID-19 cases (CASESTOT) 
and the total number of COVID-19 fatalities (FATALITIESTOT). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 3 present a descriptive analysis of every single variable. The results show that vola-
tility is higher in the short term, as compared to the long-term, as indicated by the mean, median, 
and max values of the Vol30, Vol60, Vol90, Vol180, and Vol250. Indicatively, the mean (max) of 
Vol30 and Vol60 are 0.039 (0.205 and 0.194, respectively), as compared to Vol180 and Vol250 
which values are 0.037 (0.178 and 0.174, respectively). Moving to the rest of the cross-control var-
iables, the average firm exhibits negative profitability (the mean of ROA is -0.095). Arithmetic 
means of LnCASESTOT, LnFATALITIESTOT, firm size, leverage, and market value of equity are 
4.495, 2.012, 11.629, 0.617, and 2.102 respectively. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among the sample variables. It is 
observed that all volatility measures are positively correlated with each other, while the same also 
applies to the COVID-19 measures. Hence, I consider each of them separately in my analyses. 
Additionally, both COVID-19 measures are positively and statistically significantly correlated with 
firm return volatility measures. With regards to the remaining pairwise correlation coefficients, 
none of them is higher than 0.53 (in absolute terms) and thus suggests no serious problem of mul-
ticollinearity. This is also verified by the low values of the mean-variance inflation factors (VIFs), 
which do not exceed 1.4 across all models and are even lower than the cut-off value of 10 (Stu-
denmund, 2016). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis 
I conduct multivariate analyses to test my hypothesis. Table 5 reports the panel data anal-
ysis of the effect of Covid-19 cases on firm return volatility. The first row shows the dependent var-
iable scaled to five windows (30, 60, 90, 180, 250 days). The t-statistics indicated in parenthesis, 
are based on heteroskedasticity corrected robust standard errors, clustered on firms. The empiri-
cal result further confirms that (LnCASESTOT) has a positive and statistically significant impact on 
firm returns volatility during all estimated period. Meanwhile, the t-test strongly approves that 
Covid-19 had a noticeable effect on volatility especially during early days of confirmed cases 
(Vol30), (Vol60), (Vol 90). The effect is economically significant, as one standard deviation in-
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crease in the number of Covid-19 cases (3.951) is associated with a 0.79% (0.40) increase in firm 
volatility (calculated as 3.951 x 0.002), within estimating windows of 30, 60, and 90, (180 and 250) 
days. 
The mean-variance inflation factors (VIFs), do not exceed 1.4 across all models and are 
even lower than the cut-off of 10 (Stundenmund, 2016), inferring that multicollinearity is not likely 
to be of concern. It is worth noting that all control variables have also proven to be important de-
terminants of return volatility. The coefficients of ROA and MB are significant and negative show-
ing that less profitable firms are exposed to higher return volatility. In the same line (Rowe and 
Kim, 2010; Lee and Jang, 2006) point out the unfavorable influence of ROA and MB on volatility13. 
Similarly, size negatively influences firm return volatility, imposing that large companies experience 
less return volatility, while smaller companies are more exposed to higher volatility, and higher re-
turns in both capital gain and dividends (Iqbal and Shah 2012; Olibe et al., 2008). The analogous 
result has been found at (Breen and Lerner, 1973; Gu and Kim, 2002). On the contrary, the re-
gression outcome implies that leverage had a positive and significant impact on stock return vola-
tility. This indicates that the greater the level of leverage the higher is the probability for the com-
pany to be exposed to higher return volatility. Results approve the findings of (Olibe et al., 2008; 
Gu and Kim, 2002). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
I obtain similar results when considering the number of Covid-19 fatalities (LNFATALI-
TIESTOT) as my main variable of interest. Table 6 indicates that (LNFATALITIESTOT) attains 
positive and significant coefficients, at 1%, across all estimation windows of return volatility. The 
effect of Covid-19 fatalities is higher as compared to Covid-19 cases, as a one standard deviation 
increase in the number of Covid-19 fatalities (2.861) is associated with a 0.86% (0.57%) increase 
in firm volatility (calculated as 2.861 X 0.003) within estimating windows of 30, 60, and 90 (180 and 
250) days. In addition, the results for the control variables are generally harmonious with my ex-
pectancies and the above results. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
                                               
13
The outcome is consistent with the market book value of equity expectancies, since profitability is positively related with growth 
(Collins & Kothari, 1989). Given that future earnings are affected by growth opportunities, the lower the market to book value of equity 




This study provides concurrent-evidence about the severe impact of Covid-19 on global 
markets. The empirical results suggest that both Covid-19 cases and fatalities have a positive and 
significant impact on the stock return volatility of global firms. The effect of Covid-19 fatalities is 
higher as compared to Covid-19 cases, within estimating windows of 30, 60, and 90 (180 and 250) 
days. In particular, regression results propose that stock markets react firmly during the early days 
of confirmed cases (Vol30), (Vol60), (Vol90) respectively. Also, control variables (ROA, LnAssets, 
Leverage and Market to Book Value of Equity Ratio) have played an important role on firm volatili-
ty during the entire period. This study contributes to prior literature in the following ways.  
First, the analysis adds to the existing studies which have explored the impact of external 
shocks (natural disasters, financial crises) on the stock market. Second, it complements the exist-
ing limited literature which examines the impact of Covid-19 on financial market volatility. Third, as 
far as I am concerned, this is the first study that estimates the impact of Covid-19 on global stock 
return volatility. Thus, it extends the literature of global financial markets, by taking into considera-
tion a global scale. The sample tracks 60% from approximately 51.000 active listed global firms14, 
and thus the reported results reflect the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on large scale data. Giv-
en the above results, the negative profitability and growth rate caused by the Covid-19 are likely to 
have had a negative influence on the global GDP. The empirical in some way confirms previous 
research estimation that global GDP is going to decline by a significant percentage in the future 
(Gormsen and Koijen, 2020). 
In this light, the study might be advantageous to a wide spectrum of investors, portfolio 
managers, and decision-makers, since results confirm a significant negative impact on return vola-
tility. Although the Covid-19 external shock has been extended worldwide, not all countries have 
reacted in the same way. Hence, investigating the impact of Covid-19 on the most affected coun-
tries such as Italy, Spain, France, the UK, or the United States, would be a worthwhile contribution 
to the existing literature. 
  
                                               
14
As of mid-2019, there were approximately 51.000 listed companies worldwide with a market value exceeding USD 80 trillion, equal to 
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APPENDIX A - Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Volatility Measures 
Vol30 The variance of daily stock returns over the past 30 days (Data source: 
DataStream). 
Vol60 The variance of daily stock returns over the past 60 days (Data source: 
DataStream). 
Vol90 The variance of daily stock returns over the past 90 days (Data source: 
DataStream). 
Vol180 The variance of daily stock returns over the past 180 days (Data source: 
DataStream). 
Vol250 The variance of daily stock returns over the past 250 days (Data source: 
DataStream). 
Panel B: Main independent variable – COVID-19 measures 
LnCASESTOT Natural logarithm of the total number of COVID-19 cases reported in the 
country the company is listed (Data source: World Bank). 
LnFATALITIESTOT Natural logarithm of the total number of COVID-19 fatalities reported in the 
country the company is listed (Data source: World Bank). 
Panel C: Firm fundamentals 
ROA Return on assets, measured as the ratio of income before extraordinary 
items over total assets (Data source: DataStream). 
LnASSETS Natural logarithm of total assets (Data source: DataStream). 
LEVERAGE Leverage ratio, measured as total debt over total assets (Data source: 
DataStream). 




Table 1 Sample selection process 
Sample selection stages 
Number of 
firms 
Number of firm 
years 
Companies with COVID-19 data available through World 
Bank. 
31,649 818,532 
Delete: Companies with missing financial data for our empiri-
cal model. 
1,105 34,177 
Delete: Observations of companies don't meet the four com-
panies per country criterion. 
28 1,114 
Final sample. 30,516 783,241 
 
Table 2 Country distribution of observations 
No Country Firms Obs Percent CASESTOT 
FATALI-
TIESTOT 
1 Australia 1,370 156,268 19.95 3,613.19 45.01 
2 Austria 52 755 0.10 3,247.93 100.04 
3 Bahrain 31 48 0.01 0.00 0.00 
4 Belgium 106 886 0.11 12,002.58 1,750.07 
5 Bermuda 7 251 0.03 89.74 5.39 
6 Botswana 4 260 0.03 36.20 0.99 
7 Brazil 263 718 0.09 70,411.73 3,685.29 
8 Canada 1,604 30,614 3.91 17,146.53 1,226.99 
9 China 4,124 7,244 0.92 24,401.47 1,033.32 
10 Croatia 62 62 0.01 0.00 0.00 
11 Czech Republic 12 12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
12 Denmark 105 1,341 0.17 4,730.30 215.65 
13 Egypt 149 3,575 0.46 9,445.83 400.72 
14 Estonia 16 142 0.02 802.18 23.56 
15 Finland 131 131 0.02 0.00 0.00 
16 France 526 3,573 0.46 21,546.95 3,556.49 
17 Germany 496 2,186 0.28 41,079.58 1,595.40 
18 Greece 157 157 0.02 0.00 0.00 
19 Guernsey 36 938 0.12 170.67 7.63 
20 Iceland 16 81 0.01 88.04 0.17 
21 India 2,385 152,837 19.51 224.33 5.93 
22 Indonesia 474 710 0.09 39.69 3.18 
23 Iraq 25 89 0.01 43.61 3.44 
24 Ireland 62 1,406 0.18 9,664.24 592.33 
25 Israel 396 585 0.07 1,839.24 25.60 
26 Italy 262 973 0.12 59,770.08 8,070.75 
27 Jamaica 10 400 0.05 288.25 5.21 
28 Japan 3,270 203,753 26.01 2,483.56 83.80 
29 Jersey 5 170 0.02 216.14 16.97 
30 Kenya 5 125 0.02 856.86 26.57 
31 Kuwait 138 518 0.07 2,161.80 16.55 
32 Lithuania 27 149 0.02 640.97 22.58 
33 Luxembourg 45 285 0.04 145.90 1.31 
34 Malaysia 781 32,981 4.21 2,831.76 41.87 
 
23 
No Country Firms Obs Percent CASESTOT 
FATALI-
TIESTOT 
35 Mexico 121 121 0.02 0.00 0.00 
36 Monaco 10 66 0.01 3.55 0.00 
37 Netherlands 121 641 0.08 12,545.17 1,504.05 
38 New Zealand 107 8,781 1.12 455.69 6.80 
39 Nigeria 91 913 0.12 1,625.20 43.96 
40 North Macedonia 27 27 0.00 0.00 0.00 
41 Norway 165 165 0.02 0.00 0.00 
42 Oman 78 326 0.04 1,997.83 8.86 
43 Pakistan 224 18,099 2.31 31,712.75 640.73 
44 Philippines 201 571 0.07 1,717.22 86.43 
45 Poland 12 541 0.07 11,149.63 486.03 
46 Qatar 43 43 0.01 0.00 0.00 
47 Romania 83 83 0.01 0.00 0.00 
48 Russia 169 169 0.02 0.00 0.00 
49 Saudi Arabia 5 95 0.01 388.74 1.16 
50 Singapore 500 14,631 1.87 8,895.19 6.43 
51 South Africa 135 6,065 0.77 19,464.87 383.37 
52 South Korea 1,943 4,218 0.54 2,661.26 46.58 
53 Spain 163 487 0.06 33,360.36 3,406.37 
54 Sri Lanka 203 9,483 1.21 16.01 0.03 
55 Sweden 581 3,638 0.46 13,788.42 1,385.09 
56 Switzerland 227 1,854 0.24 7,770.70 328.66 
57 Taiwan 1,760 1,760 0.22 0.00 0.00 
58 Thailand 591 2,960 0.38 812.31 13.05 
59 Turkey 5 200 0.03 85,231.79 2,252.36 
60 United Arab Emirates 103 103 0.01 0.00 0.00 
61 United Kingdom 1,018 35,513 4.53 53,768.40 7,607.10 
62 
United States Of Amer-
ica 
3,848 65,830 8.40 625,540.95 29,776.66 
63 Vietnam 830 1,635 0.21 47.78 0.00 
Total 30,516 783,241 100 - - 
Average - - - 19,094.812 1,119.786 
This table presents the country distribution of the companies included in our sample. The last four 
Columns depict the average number of: a) the total number of COVID-19 cases (CASESTOT); and 
b) the total COVID-19 fatalities (FATALITIESTOT), as per country. COVID-19 data are derived on 






Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
  Obs Min 25th Mean Median 75th Max StDev 
Vol30 783,241 0 0.016 0.039 0.029 0.049 0.205 0.035 
Vol60 783,241 0 0.017 0.039 0.03 0.048 0.194 0.034 
Vol90 783,241 0 0.018 0.039 0.03 0.048 0.187 0.033 
Vol180 783,241 0.004 0.018 0.037 0.029 0.044 0.178 0.03 
Vol250 783,241 0.004 0.018 0.037 0.028 0.043 0.174 0.029 
LnCASESTOT 783,241 0 0.693 4.495 3.434 7.937 14.443 3.951 
LnFATALITIESTOT 783,241 0 0 2.012 0 3.784 11.592 2.861 
ROA 783,241 -3.486 -0.048 -0.095 0.022 0.061 0.332 0.474 
LnASSETS 783,241 4.754 9.933 11.629 11.667 13.325 17.826 2.563 
LEVERAGE 783,241 -4.489 0.016 0.617 0.235 0.767 9.406 1.549 
MB 783,241 -12.64 0.59 2.102 1.1 2.32 27.58 4.314 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables employed in our analyses. The con-

















Table 4 Pearson correlation matrix  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Vol30 1.00 
          
2. Vol60 0.91*** 1.00 
         
3. Vol90 0.85*** 0.96*** 1.00 
        
4. Vol180 0.79*** 0.89*** 0.94*** 1.00 
       
5. Vol250 0.76*** 0.86*** 0.91*** 0.98*** 1.00 
      
6. LnCASESTOT 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.26*** 0.22*** 1.00 
     
7. LnFATALITIESTOT 0.24*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.25*** 0.21*** 0.92*** 1.00 
    
8. ROA -0.35*** -0.40*** -0.42*** -0.47*** -0.49*** -0.08*** -0.07*** 1.00 
   
9. LnASSETS -0.38*** -0.43*** -0.46*** -0.51*** -0.53*** -0.00*** 0.01*** 0.47*** 1.00 
  
10. LEVERAGE -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.02*** -0.01*** 0.10*** 0.21*** 1.00 
 
11. MB -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.01*** 0.32*** 1.00 
This table correlation coefficients of the variables used in our main analysis. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Values with 







Table 5 The impact of COVID-19 cases on firm return volatility 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Vol30 Vol60 Vol90 Vol180 Vol250 
LnCASESTOT 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(57.87) (55.85) (54.03) (44.34) (41.95) 
ROA -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 
(-15.11) (-14.12) (-11.18) (-13.00) (-14.47) 
LnASSETS -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 
(-28.52) (-39.10) (-41.58) (-36.25) (-31.76) 
LEVERAGE 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
(5.15) (10.92) (12.14) (9.35) (9.05) 
MB -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-2.67) (-8.93) (-9.07) (-5.60) (-5.28) 
(intercept) 0.065*** 0.085*** 0.099*** 0.102*** 0.100*** 
 
(27.32) (35.90) (38.33) (38.86) (36.25) 
      Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.335 0.413 0.440 0.476 0.494 
Mean VIF 1.261 1.302 1.326 1.337 1.345 
Observations 783,172 783,172 783,172 783,172 783,172 
This table reports the panel data analyses of the effect of COVID-19 cases on firm return volatility. 
The dependent variables are: a) the variance of daily stock returns over the past 30 days – Vol30 
(Column 1); b) the variance of daily stock returns over the past 60 days – Vol60 (Column 2); c) the 
variance of daily stock returns over the past 90 days – Vol90 (Column 3); d) the variance of daily 
stock returns over the past 180 days – Vol180 (Column 4); and e) the variance of daily stock re-
turns over the past 250 days – Vol250 (Column 5).The t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
heteroskedasticity corrected robust standard errors, clustered on firms. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles The statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 










Table 6 The impact of COVID-19 fatalities on firm return volatility 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Vol30 Vol60 Vol90 Vol180 Vol250 
LnFATALITIESTOT 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
(41.56) (44.72) (46.28) (41.31) (39.48) 
ROA -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.011*** 
 
(-14.15) (-13.63) (-11.20) (-13.28) (-14.68) 
LnASSETS -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 
(-30.01) (-39.20) (-40.18) (-33.65) (-29.28) 
LEVERAGE 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 
(6.50) (10.80) (11.45) (8.34) (7.95) 
MB -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-4.21) (-8.65) (-8.29) (-4.59) (-4.22) 
(intercept) 0.067*** 0.087*** 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.098*** 
 
(28.08) (36.09) (37.80) (37.17) (34.40) 
      Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.316 0.403 0.441 0.480 0.497 
Mean VIF 1.244 1.289 1.317 1.334 1.342 
Observations 783,172 783,172 783,172 783,172 783,172 
This table reports the panel data analyses of the effect of COVID-19 fatalities on firm return volatili-
ty. The dependent variables are: a) the variance of daily stock returns over the past 30 days – 
Vol30 (Column 1); b) the variance of daily stock returns over the past 60 days – Vol60 (Column 2); 
c) the variance of daily stock returns over the past 90 days – Vol90 (Column 3); d) the variance of 
daily stock returns over the past 180 days – Vol180 (Column 4); and e) the variance of daily stock 
returns over the past 250 days – Vol250 (Column 5).The t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
heteroskedasticity corrected robust standard errors, clustered on firms. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles The statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels are indicated by *, **, and ***.All variables are defined in the Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
